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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, the author deals with: (1) Definition of government; incentive structure under 
government: taxation, war and territorial expansion. (2) Origin of money; government and money; 
the devolution of money from commodity to fiat money. (3) International politics and monetary 
regimes; monetary imperialism and the drive toward a one-world central bank and fiat currency. 
 
 
1. Government defined 
 
Let me begin with the definition of government: A government is a compulsory 
territorial monopolist of ultimate decision-making (jurisdiction) and, implied in this, a 
compulsory territorial monopolist of taxation. That is, a government is the ultimate 
arbiter, for the inhabitants of a given territory, regarding what is just and what is not, 
and it can determine unilaterally, i.e., without requiring the consent of those seeking 
justice or arbitration, the price that justice-seekers must pay to the government for 
providing this service. (1) Except for some so-called public choice economists such as 
James Buchanan, it is obvious that such an extraordinary institution cannot arise 
“naturally”, as the outcome of voluntary contractual agreements among individual 
property owners. (2) For no one would agree to a deal that entitled someone else, 
once and for all, to determine whether or not one was truly the owner of one’s own 
property, and no one would agree to a deal that entitled this monopoly judge with the 
power to impose taxes on oneself. Rather, an institution such as government would 
normally, and from the outset, be regarded as an illegitimate and indeed criminal 
protection racket. And as a protection racket, this institution would tend to be brought 
down quickly. It is only possible for such an institution to survive for any length of 
time if and insofar as it succeeds in instilling in the “protected” public a myth, i.e., a 
false yet generally held, and hence effective, belief. In order to make the public 
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accept, i.e., not to resist, the protection racket, it must be persuaded that without a 
monopoly of jurisdiction and taxation (that is, in what has been called a “state of 
nature”) constant warfare among individual property owners would exist. I have called 
this belief the Hobbesian myth and identified it as the most powerful and widespread 
myth of the modern world. (3)  
It is not my intention here to further analyze this myth. Rather, I want to analyze and 
develop the consequences that follow from the fact that this view is actually believed, 
and hence, that a protection racket is regarded as legitimate - as a government rather 
than a protection racket. First, if government is generally held to be necessary for the 
establishment of internal peace, it follows that its agents will take advantage of their 
monopoly: they will increase taxes and reinterpret the law to their own advantage. The 
price of justice will rise and its quality will fall. In other words, government does 
indeed have an interest in making peace among its subjects, i.e., in preventing one 
subject from warring against and/or robbing another one, but only in order to rob all 
of its subjects more successfully itself. 
However, instead of concentrating on the internal consequences of government, I want 
to concentrate my attention on the external consequences, i.e., on its foreign rather 
than domestic policy. In this regard, two observations are of fundamental importance. 
On the one hand, by virtue of its power to define and interpret the law and to tax, 
every government is faced with the risk of exit. Its subjects might leave the territory 
over which the government’s authority extends in order to avoid taxation and its 
perversions of law. And every such exit implies a loss of potential revenue to the 
government, whereas any population increase promises potentially higher tax 
revenues. 
On the other hand, at least at the outset many competing governments exist, each not 
only faced with the threat of exit but also equipped with the power to tax, i.e., to 
externalize the cost of territorial expansion (foreign aggression) onto its own subject 
population. Hence, it can be predicted that competing states will come into conflict 
with one another. The competition between governments is different, however, than 
the competition of private firms. In any given territory, only one monopolist of 
jurisdiction and taxation can exist. Hence, the competition between governments will 
tend to be violent, resulting in interstate wars, and eliminative. By means of war, one 
state expands its territory at the expense of another, and the number of remaining 
states will progressively fall. A tendency toward political centralization is set in motion 
which comes to a halt only once a single world government has been established and 
the threat of exit is thus eliminated. (4)  
We can be even more specific regarding the tendency toward political concentration 
in questioning which states will tend to be victorious in interstate warfare. Victory or 
defeat depends on many factors, of course, but in the long run, the decisive factor is 
the relative amount of economic resources at a government’s disposal. In taxing and 
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regulating, governments do not contribute to the creation of economic wealth. Instead, 
they parasitically draw on existing wealth. However, governments can influence the 
amount of existing wealth negatively. Other things being equal, the lower the tax and 
regulation burden imposed by a government on its domestic economy, the larger its 
population will tend to grow (on account of internal reasons as well as immigration 
factors), and the larger the amount of domestically produced wealth will be on which it 
can draw in its conflicts with neighboring competitors. That is, states which tax and 
regulate their domestic economies comparatively little - liberal states - tend to defeat 
and expand their territories at the expense of less-liberal ones. This explains, for 
instance, why during the nineteenth century Britain became the dominant imperial 
power, and why in the twentieth century this role has fallen to the U.S. 
Even more specifically, it explains why the United States, internally one of the most 
liberal states, has conducted the most aggressive foreign policy, while the Soviet 
Union, for instance, with its entirely illiberal (repressive) domestic policies has 
engaged in a comparatively peaceful and cautious foreign policy. The US knew that it 
could militarily beat any other state; hence, it has been aggressive. In contrast, the 
Soviet Union knew that it was bound to lose a military confrontation with any state of 
substantial size unless it could win within a few days or weeks. (5)  
 
 
2. Government and money 
  
Now let me turn to the next question: the relationship of government and money. Here 
it is hardly necessary to explain in great detail that money is the natural outgrowth of a 
market economy. Due to the existence of uncertainty, in barter fundamental obstacles 
to trade exist. Double coincidents of wants are not always present; hence, direct trade 
becomes impossible. As a way out of this predicament, man begins to look for 
especially marketable goods, and trades whatever he has to sell for more marketable 
goods in order to be able to then turn around and acquire with these those things that 
he really wants. That is, man begins to demand things to be used neither as consumer 
nor producer goods, but as a facilitator (medium) of exchange. Others copy this 
practice, and sooner or later most people in society use the same good for the same 
purpose. Money, a commonly used medium of exchange emerges. And as trade 
becomes world-wide, a tendency toward the use of a single world-wide medium of 
exchange comes into existence. Historically, this was the international gold standard. 
(6)  
Money, then, comes into existence as a commodity money. In fact, money is the most 
easily saleable commodity. It is produced by the market, like any other good. There is 
competition in gold mining and gold minting; and in addition to genuine money, there 
are money substitutes, i.e., titles (notes) to money. This, then, is the situation with 
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which governments find themselves confronted: a commodity money such as gold, 
produced by profit -driven money producers and entirely outside of the government’s 
control. 
Now recall the definition of government as a monopolist of jurisdiction and taxation, 
and assume no more than self-interest for government agents, i.e., that they as 
everyone else prefer more over less income. What will be the government’s position 
vis-à-vis a market provided money? As should be immediately clear, it will try to gain 
monopolistic control over the supply of money, so as to be able to enrich itself at the 
expense of its subjects (very much as it enriches itself at the expense of its subjects by 
means of taxation). (7)  
In order to reach this goal, a government must take three consecutive steps. Indeed, 
all governments have taken these steps. Some have done it earlier and others later, 
but all of them have done so in the same order. First, a government monopolizes the 
minting of gold. No one but the government mint is permitted to produce gold coins. 
With this step it becomes possible for the government to engage in coinclipping, i.e., 
surreptitiously reducing the gold content of coins. In recalling and reminting gold 
coins, and reducing, for example, the gold content of a coin by 10 percent and 
increasing the supply of coins by 10 percent, the government essentially accomplishes 
the same thing as raising the tax revenue by 10 percent, except, of course, that it is 
more difficult to understand the causes and consequences of inflation than it is to 
understand the causes and consequences of higher taxes. However, this first step is 
still highly unsatisfactory from the point of view of government, because it cannot 
engage in this practice repeatedly without some people eventually realizing what is 
going on. 
In the second step, the government monopolizes the production of money substitutes, 
i.e., of paper titles to gold-property. No one except the government bank can issue 
banknotes redeemable at par into genuine money. The commercial banks may only 
produce checkbook-money (substitutes of money-substitutes). That is, paper that is 
convertible at par into government produced paper, which in turn can be converted 
into genuine money (gold). With this step it becomes possible for a government to 
engage in fractional reserve banking practices. The government bank creates 
additional money substitutes out of thin air, uncovered by genuine money. Or put 
differently, it creates more titles to money property than there is money property in 
existence. (8) By bringing these titles into circulation it enriches itself at the expense of 
the general public. Again: an increase of money substitutes, created practically at zero 
cost, of say 10 percent beyond gold coverage has the same effect as a 10 percent tax 
increase; but taking the course and form of inflation, it is more difficult to detect than 
the tax increase. However, even this second step is unsatisfactory from the point of 
view of government because eventually the public will realize what is going on. And 
once it does, runs on the central bank will occur. The holders of titles to money will 
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want to have their titles redeemed into the genuine thing. But since there exist more 
titles (notes) than property (gold), the central bank, faced with a run, will either go 
bankrupt or suspend specie payment. 
In the third step the government goes off the gold standard. The gold deposited in 
government vaults is confiscated and the private ownership of gold is outlawed. 
Having acquired purchasing power as something else - and more - than mere pieces of 
paper, namely as titles to a money commodity (property), the former money 
substitutes become money. A pure fiat money currency takes the place of the former 
commodity money standard. Finally, or so it seems, the government has reached 
complete counterfeiting autonomy and can print money, out of thin air, and acquire 
real goods with this paper. The only task remaining seems to be that of avoiding 
hyperinflation. 
In fact, other problems and obstacles remain in place even then. Before addressing 
them, however, a few remarks must be made concerning the question of how the 
government can get away with taking the three steps just outlined. It can only do so if 
it succeeds in creating a favorable public opinion. In order to do so it will have to 
promote a few myths, i.e., make the public believe a few erroneous but somehow 
plausible propositions: First, that competition in money production will lead to fraud 
by profit-driven capitalists (even though competition is in fact precisely the means of 
reducing the likelihood of fraud, and fraud will actually be more likely if money is 
produced by a monopolist). Second, that a commodity money involves substantial 
resource costs which could be saved and the resources productively invested if one 
had a paper money standard in place (while, in fact, as even such an ardent fan of 
paper money as Milton Friedman admitted late in his life, a paper money standard 
and the increased financial uncertainty brought about by it increases the expenditures 
- and the waste of resources - in activities such as hedging, financial newsletters, etc., 
and has actually driven up the price of demonetized gold, and hence the volume of 
gold production). (9) And third, that money is part of social wealth such that more 
money means greater wealth (while, in fact, money is not part of social wealth and a 
larger amount of money only leads to a falling purchasing power of money, while more 
money leads to a redistribution of the existing wealth in society and benefits the early 
receivers and spenders of this money at the expense of those receiving and spending it 
later). 
 
 
3. Monetary Imperialism 
 
Now back to the obstacles that still remain in the path of governments wanting to 
achieve total counterfeiting autonomy. They become obvious once we introduce the 
existence of more than one government into the picture. Let us first assume that these 
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competing governments are of roughly equal strength as regards their military power 
only to return then to the beginning, i.e., the tendency  toward political centralization, 
imperialism, and ultimately world government. (10)  
Let us take the example of two countries, France and Italy, and briefly analyze the 
situation first for stage two in the process of the destruction of the gold standard and 
then for stage three. In stage two, both France and Italy have monopolized the minting 
as well as the production of money substitutes. If the French government now, based 
on its monopoly in the production of money substitutes (titles to gold), increases the 
production of paper Francs beyond the increase of paper Liras, prices in France will 
increase relative to prices in Italy. Consequently, exports from France to Italy will fall, 
and imports into France from Italy increase. In order to pay for this increasing volume 
of imports, gold will flow out of France and into Italy. Consequently, the ratio of gold 
reserves to paper-Francs will fall, increasing the likelihood of a run on the French 
central bank. France must now reduce the supply of paper Francs, and the 
forementioned imbalance will be reversed. Thus, as much as each individual 
government would like to inflate, this inclination is constrained by the existence of 
other governments and their currency. (11)  
The situation is similar in stage three with pure paper currencies in existence and gold 
out of the picture. If France now inflates faster than Italy, again exports from France 
will decline and imports into France increase. But instead of an outflow of gold from 
France to Italy, now the French Franc will depreciate relative to the Italian Lira, and 
the trade imbalance will be reversed in this way. Again, the tendency of each 
individual government to engage in inflation is curtailed by the existence of other 
governments and the fluctuations in the currency markets. 
Returning to my initial remarks, it is necessary to recognize how the remaining 
obstacles to counterfeiting autonomy are to be overcome. Let us consider a world in 
which the process of political concentration has been effective for some time. As the 
result of interstate wars, large and mighty superpowers exist such as the U.S. and 
smaller, militarily defeated and dominated countries such as Germany. In contrast to 
the situation between two “equal” countries, France and Italy, monetary relations 
between the U.S. and Germany are significantly different and reflect this power 
difference. (12)  
In this case too we can distinguish between two stages of development. Exemplary of 
the first one is the system that was established at Bretton Woods. The U.S. is off the 
gold standard domestically, but it assumes the responsibility of redeeming paper 
dollars into gold (at fixed parity) vis-à-vis the German central bank, while the German 
central bank promises to exchange paper marks into paper dollars (at fixed parity). It 
would seem that Germany is still on the gold standard, for marks can be redeemed 
into dollars and dollars into gold. De facto, however, matters are completely different. 
The German central bank is pressured not to make use of its right to redeem dollar 
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notes into gold but to use its dollars instead as reserves on top of which it creates 
mark notes. I will explain what is now in existence in the starkest possible terms in 
order to make the situation as clear as possible. Now let’s say the U.S. central bank 
creates $50,000 out of thin air and uses this money to buy DM 150,000 (assuming 
an exchange rate of 1:3) from the German central bank and then turns around and 
buys, let’s say, a Mercedes for this price. What does the German bank do with its 
$50,000? Does it buy something in the U.S. or insist on redeeming this sum into 
gold? The answer is of course, No. Rather, the $50,000 are registered as an increase 
in the bank’s dollar reserves, and given this increase, the German bank then creates 
an additional DM 150,000 out of thin air, and turns around and buys itself a new 
Mercedes, too. 
Obviously, the U.S. now has a trade deficit with Germany: imports exceed exports. 
However, this is a “deficit without tears” (13) because no payment (exports) is being 
made for the imported Mercedes, and the dollar does not fall against the mark. 
Instead, a system of two-fold exploitation is imposed on the German public. First, it 
gets ripped off by the U.S. central bank, then, facilitated by the first rip-off, it gets 
ripped off once more by its own central bank. We can call this system monetary 
imperialism. 
But this first stage of monetary imperialism is still imperfect from the point of view of 
the dominant country, the U.S. There may still exist other countries, not yet fully 
controlled by the U.S., let’s say France under someone like de Gaulle, fancying 
himself to be the president of a mighty military power in its own right. In this case, the 
German central bank might be tempted to sell its dollars to the French bank in 
exchange for Francs, and the French central bank in turn might be audacious enough 
to approach the U.S. with a request for redemption into gold. But, of course the U.S. 
does not have the gold or has insufficient amounts of it. The bluff has been called, 
and the U.S. is faced with a bank run. What should be done? The answer depends on 
the relative strength of the parties involved. In fact, as we know, given the superpower 
status of the U.S. and the insignificant status of France, de Gaulle’s aspirations 
notwithstanding, the U.S. simply suspended specie payment, France essentially did 
nothing but to accept the fait accompli, and the world entered stage two of U.S.-
managed monetary imperialism.  
The second stage is like stage one except that gold no longer plays a role. All 
countries are on a pure fiat money standard. The U.S. initiates the process of 
inflation, and by using dollars as reserve currency, U.S. inflation is exported to U.S.-
dominated countries, while goods flow into the U.S. in the same way as described 
before. Yet a run on the U.S. gold reserves is no longer possible, of course. Even this 
system is unsatisfactory, however. In a world of many countries, and even if the U.S. 
is a superpower with troops stationed in well over 100 countries around the globe, this 
system of coordinated inflation is bound to crack again and again. On the one hand, a 
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U.S.-dominated country might suffer more inflation than the U.S., its currency would 
depreciate against the dollar, and in order to save government-connected investors in 
those countries, the U.S. might be compelled to engage in expensive bailout 
operations, i.e., buying up the falling currency in order to stabilize it. On the other 
hand (and this is potentially even more dangerous), a U.S.-dominated country may 
inflate less than the U.S., its currency would appreciate against the dollar, and, if this 
became a trend, the dollar would lose trust and might be abandoned in favor of the 
other, harder currency. 
As the final solution in the drive toward monetary imperialism and as a decisive 
intermediate step in the drive toward world government, the U.S. has been working 
long and hard to establish a U.S.-controlled world central bank issuing a single, world-
wide accepted paper currency. (14) Only then are all obstacles to government 
counterfeiting eliminated because then the currency can no longer rise or fall against 
any other as no other currencies are left. The monetary integration currently under 
way in Europe, the establishment of a Europe-wide EURO, is an important step in this 
direction. The EURO will be more inflationary than the least inflationary of the 
previously existing national European currencies, the German mark. And it is easier 
for the U.S. central bank to “cooperate” with a single European central bank than 
with some fifteen or so different banks. Moreover, whereas these fifteen odd banks 
also could (and in fact did) use other reserve currencies besides the dollar, namely 
those of other European currencies (notably the German mark), with these other 
currencies gone, what else but the dollar can the European bank use for this purpose? 
Do not forget, however, that success in this attempt to establish a world central bank 
requires public support, and to secure this support it is necessary to promote another 
myth. Indeed, the same myth that is propagated currently in Europe to establish the 
EURO. This is the myth that a single currency reduces transaction costs. There will be 
no more tedious exchanging of money when you travel from Germany to Italy, for 
example. This myth contains an important half-truth - and this makes it particular 
dangerous and potentially effective, because it is indeed true that money more truly 
serves its purpose as a medium of exchange the more widely it is used. International 
trade and economic calculation is in fact facilitated by the existence of a single money. 
Commodity money such as gold, which emerges as the result of markets and market 
exchange, has the tendency to become a world-wide used commodity money as trade 
expands. (15)  
Matters are fundamentally different, however, if this money is a fiat money produced 
by a government world central bank. Given the nature of government, we can safely 
predict that such a money will be more inflationary and lead to a more massive 
redistribution of income and wealth in favor of government and its favorite supporter-
clients at the expense of the general public than anything seen so far. Indeed, if we 
are to have a fiat money (rather than a commodity money), and the only alternative is 
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to have competing national paper currencies or an international paper money, the 
choice is clear: As much as competing and fluctuating paper currencies are 
dysfunctional as facilitators of exchange, the former alternative is infinitely better. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The course of human history is ultimately determined by ideas, whether they be true 
or false. There is no natural law that causes government, interstate war, imperialism, 
and finally world government. Nor is there a natural law stating that a market-
provided commodity money such as gold will be destroyed eventually and replaced by 
government produced fiat (paper) money. These events and tendencies only occur and 
prevail if and as long as a majority of the public holds certain beliefs. (16) In 
particular, the public must believe in the above mentioned Hobbesian myth and the 
myth that money constitutes part of social wealth (such that more money implies more 
wealth). Once the public has grasped that government is a protection racket and a 
warmonger (rather than a protector and peacemaker), and that a central bank and 
government paper money are simply the government’s Department of Money-
Counterfeiting and the instruments for continual redistribution of income and wealth 
in favor of the government and its friends, not only will we be spared the nightmare of 
world government and world paper money but we may actually see the restoration of 
the gold standard and the withering away of the state as a moral and economic 
perversity. 
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